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Abstract
We describe some bulk statistics of historical initial
line outages and the implications for forming contin-
gency lists and understanding which initial outages are
likely to lead to further cascading. We use historical
outage data to estimate the effect of weather on cascad-
ing via cause codes and via NOAA storm data. Bad
weather significantly increases outage rates and inter-
acts with cascading effects, and should be accounted for
in cascading models and simulations. We suggest how
weather effects can be incorporated into the OPA cas-
cading simulation and validated. There are very good
prospects for improving data processing and models for
the bulk statistics of historical outage data so that cas-
cading can be better understood and quantified.
1. Introduction
Cascading failure can be defined as a sequence of de-
pendent outages that successively weakens or degrades
the power transmission system [1]. Although the power
transmission system is carefully designed and operated
to be robust to multiple outages, cascading outages that
are large enough to cause load shedding and blackouts
do occur. The large cascading blackouts that are of
the greatest concern are infrequent, but likely enough
to have substantial risk [2–5].
Cascading is the general way that transmission black-
outs become widespread and there are many mecha-
nisms that contribute to initial outages or the subsequent
propagation of outages. There are a correspondingly
large variety of models, approximations, simulations,
and procedures to assess and mitigate cascading outages
[1, 6]. One way to evaluate and improve these efforts is
validation with observed historical data [7–9]. There is
now much more systematic and automated collection of
outage data by utilities, but the challenges of extracting
and processing useful information from the data remain.
In this paper, we report on some bulk statistical pro-
cessing of 14 years of transmission line outage data
from a large North American utility to describe initial
line outages and to start to explore the effect of weather
on cascading. Our data-driven analysis of the effect of
weather on the bulk statistics of cascading and aspects
of our bulk statistical analysis of initial line outages are
novel. Incorporating some of these effects in the OPA
(Oakridge-Pserc-Alaska) cascading blackout simulation
is also considered (see summary of OPA in section 7).
Instead of working directly with data as in this paper,
one can make simulation models that use or are tuned
to typical parameter values. Several authors have taken
this approach to propose models of weather effects in
cascading simulations [10–13].
While historical data processing has many advan-
tages, including no modeling assumptions and a very fa-
vorable grounding in reality, it should be noted that the
grid evolves over 14 years, and that statistical analysis of
historical cascades necessarily describes cascading risk
averaged over the time period of observation.
2. Historical outage data and its processing
The transmission line outage data consists of 42 561
automatic and planned line outages recorded by a North
American utility over a period of 14 years starting in
January 1999 [14]. The data includes the outage start
time (to the nearest minute), names of the buses at both
ends of the line, and the dispatcher cause code. The
automatic line outages are identified. All this data is
standard and routinely collected by utilities. For ex-
ample, this data is reported by North American utili-
ties in NERC’s Transmission Availability Data System
(TADS) [15, 16] and is also collected in other countries.
Having formed the network model from the automatic
and planned line outages [17], the analysis of cascading
focuses on only the automatic outages. There are 10 942
automatic outages in the data. The network model has
614 lines, 361 buses and is a connected network.
Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50233
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Page 2727
The structure of cascading is that each cascade starts
with initial outages in the first generation followed by
further outages grouped into subsequent generations un-
til the cascade stops [18]. The first step in processing
the line outages is to group the line outages into indi-
vidual cascades, and then within each cascade to group
the outages that occur in close succession into genera-
tions. The grouping of the outages into cascades and
generations within each cascade is done based on the
outage start times according to the methods of [19, 20].
We summarize the procedure here and refer to [20] for
the details. The grouping is done by looking at the gaps
in start time between successive outages.
If successive outages have a gap of one hour or more,
then the outage after the gap starts a new cascade. (That
is, suppose o1, o2, ... are the outage start times in their
order of occurrence. A gap of more than one hour is de-
fined as a time interval between successive outage start
times oi, oi+1 such that oi+1 − oi ≥ 1 hour. The time
before the first outage start time o1 and the time after
the last outage start time are also considered to be gaps
of more than hour. Let g1, g2, ... be all the gaps of
more than one hour in their order of occurrence. Then
cascade number k is defined to be all the outages that
have start times between the gaps gk and gk+1. An al-
ternative and equivalent definition is that a cascade is a
maximal series of outages with successive outage start
times for which the time difference between successive
outage start times in the series is less than one hour. A
cascade may consist of one outage or many outages.)
Within each cascade, if successive outages have a gap
of more than one minute, then the outage after the gap
starts a new generation of the cascade. (That is, suppose
ok,1, ok,2, ... are the outage start times in their order
of occurrence for all the outages in cascade k . A gap
of more than one minute is defined as a time interval
between successive outage start times ok,i, ok,i+1 such
that ok,i+1 − ok,i > 1 minute. The time before the first
outage start time ok,1 in the cascade k and the time after
the last outage start time in cascade k are also consid-
ered to be gaps of more than minute. Let gk,1, gk,2, ...
be all the gaps of more than one minute in cascade k in
their order of occurrence. Then generation number ` of
cascade number k is defined to be all the outages in cas-
cade k that have start times between the gaps gk,` and
gk,`+1.) Since the outage times are only known to the
nearest minute, the order of outages within a generation
often cannot be determined.
This simple method of defining cascades and genera-
tions of outages appears to effective and has gap thresh-
olds consistent with power system time scales since op-
erator actions are usually completed within one hour
and fast transients and protection actions such as auto-
reclosing are completed within one minute. [20] exam-
ines the robustness of cascade propagation with respect
to varying these gap thresholds.
This data processing applied to the 10 942 automatic
outages yields 6687 cascades. Most of the cascades are
short: 84% of the cascades have only the first genera-
tion of outages and do not spread beyond these initial
outages. It is important for a fair statistical analysis to
include the short cascades (even if they are for other pur-
poses not thought of as cascades); the short cascades
usually represent a successful case of resilience in which
no load is shed. That is, excluding the short cascades
would misleadingly bias the results towards the more
damaging cascades that do not stop quickly.
The grouping of outages in each cascade into genera-
tions allows the initial outages in the first generation to
be distinguished from the subsequently cascading out-
ages in the following generations. This is of interest
because the mechanisms and mitigations of the initial
line outages differ significantly from the interactions be-
tween line outages that are involved in the subsequent
cascade.
Most of the initial line outages are single outages, but
there are also multiple initial outages. In other words,
there are single, double, triple, etc. contingencies. The
probability distribution of the number of initial outages
is shown by the black dots in Figure 1. The distribution
of the initial outages is one way of looking at the severity
of initial events: 12% of the initial events have more than
one outage (the probability of one initial outage is 88%),
1.5% of the initial events have more than 3 outages, and
0.2% have more than 5 outages.
Cascading increases the probabilities of multiple line
outages. The distribution of the total number of out-
ages after cascading is shown by the red squares in Fig-
ure 1. 26% of the total number of outages have more
than one outage, 6.6% of the total number of outages
have more than 3 outages, 2.7% have more than 5 out-
ages, and 0.7% have 10 or more outages. The effect of
cascading is progressively larger for the cascades with
more outages. For example, while cascading approxi-
mately doubles the probability of more than one outage,
cascading increases the probability of more than 5 out-
ages by an order of magnitude.
The generations of outages in the cascades are anal-
ogous to human generations; parents in one generation
give rise to children in the next generation. The average
propagation per parent λ is the total number of child out-
ages in all the generations divided by the total number of
parent outages in all the generations. λ calculated from
our data is 0.28. That is, each outage in a generation
will, on average, be followed by 0.28 outages in the next
generation. λ quantifies in an overall way how much
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Figure 1. Probability of more than k out-
ages vs. k for the initial line outages and
for the total line outages after cascading
cascading increases the number of line outages starting
from the initial line outages.
3 Statistics of initial outages
We examine the basic statistics of the automatic
initial line outages (those outages in the first gener-
ation of cascading). The annual outage frequencies
µ1, µ2, µ3, . . . , µ614 for the 614 lines range from zero
outages to 23 outages per year, with a mean annual fre-
quency µ = 0.92 outages per year.
The large variation in initial line outage frequency µi
in this data has several implications. It is clear that cas-
cading simulations that aim to quantify cascading risk
should sample from realistic initial line outage frequen-
cies. One way to accomplish this is to simulate a real
power system and use the observed historical frequency
of line outages. Another way to accomplish this is to
understand and model the factors or characteristics that
largely determine the frequency of initial line outages
so that they can be represented in artificial power sys-
tem models. For example, it might be expected that out-
age frequency has some dependence on line length and
other characteristics. (Our data suggests a mild correla-
tion of 0.3 between outage frequency and line length for
lines between 1 and 50 miles long.) Another implica-
tion is that it may be difficult to classify the probability
of higher order initial outages (when assumed roughly
independent) by the number of outages using the order
of magnitude of the probabilities [21] because the single
outages vary so much in their probability.
The data in Figure 1 shows a substantial probability
of multiple initial outages. The empirical probability
of two initial outages is 0.084 with standard deviation
0.0034. To determine whether this can arise from inde-
pendent single line outages, we suppose that each of the
614 lines has initial outages according to a Poisson pro-
cess of rate 368/614 = 0.60 outages per year and that
the Poisson processes for different lines are independent.
Then the outages of any of the lines is a Poisson process
of rate 368 outages per year, which matches the rate ex-
tracted from data in the next paragraph. Multiple initial
line outages in the data require at least 2 line outages
to occur at times that are either in the same or adjacent
minutes when the times are quantized to minutes. Given
the first outage time, this requires the second outage to
occur within a 3 minute interval. (For example, if the
quantization works by quantizing the time t in minutes
to btc, the greatest integer number of minutes less than t,
then t1 and t2 are in the same or adjacent quantized min-
utes if and only if bt1c − 1 < t2 ≤ bt1c+ 2.) The prob-
ability that the second outage occurs within a given 3
minute interval is 1−exp[−(3×368)/525600] = 0.002.
Therefore the probability of multiple initial outages and
in particular the probability of 2 initial outages are both
bounded above by 0.002. Since the empirical probabil-
ity of 2 initial outages is 0.084, an order of magnitude
greater than 0.002, the double initial outages are depen-
dent and cannot be regarded as mainly arising from inde-
pendent single line outages. It also follows that multiple
initial line outages are dependent. A similar claim of de-
pendence for all outages (not just the initial outages) is
established in previous work [20–22].
The previous paragraph assumes that initial outages
are a Poisson process of rate 368 outages per year. The
assumption that initial outages are a Poisson process is
supported by examining the distribution of the logarithm
of time differences between successive outage times in
Figure 2. For an exact Poisson process, the time differ-
ences follow an exponential distribution with the same
rate as the Poisson process, so that the logarithm of the
survival function of the time differences is a linear func-
tion with the slope of the line determining the rate. The
time differences of both the initial outages and all the
outages are approximately linear except for the smaller
time differences of order one hour or less. (The in-
creased, superlinear number of smaller time differences
in all the outages may be attributed to cascading. There
are no time differences between initial outages more
than one minute and less than one hour because of the
data processing that defines the start of new cascades.
The initial and all outages also show a fraction of out-
ages that have a time difference less than one minute
or zero.) The dotted line in Figure 2 approximates the
slope of the time differences except for the smaller time
differences of order one hour or less and has a slope cor-
responding to 368 outages per year. The Poisson process
model for initial outages is similar to the Poisson process
model of blackout start times analyzed in [5], except that
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Figure 2. Probability distribution (survival
function) of time differences between suc-
cessive initial line outages (upper curve)
and all line outages (lower curve). Note the
logarithmic vertical scale. Dotted straight
line has slope corresponding to an expo-
nential distribution of time differenceswith
rate 368 outages per year.
Table 1. Double initial line outages by type
outaged lines all weather no weather random
adjacent 55% 53% 55% 2%
parallel 20% 11% 24% 0%
separated 16% 26% 11% 97%
repeated 9% 10% 9% 1%
here we do not consider any adjustment to the Poisson
process to account for a slowly varying rate.
The multiple initial outages have significant spatial
dependence. Consider the classification of initial double
outages in Table 1. The double outages are either two
adjacent lines (lines with exactly one bus in common),
two parallel lines (two buses in common), two separated
lines (no common buses), or are repeat outages of the
same line. More than half (55%) of the double outages
are adjacent lines and only 16% of the double outages
are two lines that are separated in the network. In con-
trast, randomly sampling double line outages by choos-
ing each of the double lines randomly proportional to
their outage frequency yields only 2% that are two adja-
cent lines and 97% that are two lines that are separated
in the network. Combining the adjacent, parallel, and
repeated outages shows that 84% of the initial double
line outages form connected subgraphs.
Outages can be caused by line, bus or breaker faults.
Line faults are isolated by the breakers at each end of
the line so that they usually cause single line outages,
while the bus or breaker faults can cause multiple out-
ages because of the substation protection system design.
Although we do not know any specifics of the substa-
tion designs, one likely cause of the high proportion of
adjacent double line initial outages is substation breaker
schemes that disconnect two lines for certain faults.
2% of the initial outages are triple outages and 75% of
these initial triple outages are connected subgraphs. 4%
of the initial outages have 3 or more outages and 68% of
these initial multiple outages are connected subgraphs.
Spatially close components that are assumed to always
outage together for cascading failure analysis are called
protection control groups [23] or functional groups [21].
While there clearly would be some overlap, we do not
yet know how exactly the connected subgraphs that form
the majority of these initial outages are related to the
functional groups that can be applied to approximate the
protection system actions. The historical data samples
from functional groups, but also samples from rarer or
more unusual conditions.
It can also be helpful for risk analysis to find out
whether different types of multiple initial outages can
cause subsequent outages. Our data shows that sepa-
rated initial line outages are more likely to trigger sub-
sequent cascading outages: 25% of separated initial line
outages have subsequent outages, while only 16% of
connected initial line outages have subsequent outages.
The Mann-Whitney test shows this difference is signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level (p-value is 0.00355). For momen-
tary initial outages (duration less than one minute) ver-
sus non-momentary initial outages, our data shows lit-
tle difference in the proportion of subsequent cascading
outages: 18% of momentary outages have subsequent
outages, and 15% of non-momentary outages have sub-
sequent outages. The Mann-Whitney test shows that
this difference is not significant at the 0.01 level (p-
value is 0.0197). This suggests that momentary and non-
momentary initial outages be treated equally in assess-
ing the risk of further cascading.
The distinction in the processed line outage data be-
tween initial outages and subsequently cascading out-
ages allows us to find out and compare which lines are
most involved in these two different processes. The top
10 lines involved in initial outages overlap, but do not
coincide with the top 10 lines involved in subsequent
cascading; there are 6 lines in common but there are 4
lines in each list that differ. Similarly, the top 20 lines in-
volved in initial outages have 10 lines in common with
the top 20 lines involved in subsequent cascading and
10 lines in each list that differ. Similar results were
obtained by processing line outage data from a neigh-
boring utility [9]. It should be noted that statistically
prominent outage problems in an initial portion of the
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historical data may have been already mitigated.
4 Effect of weather and other influences
via cause codes
The dispatcher outage cause codes allow classifica-
tion of the cascades of outages into two groups: weather
related and non-weather related. (For definiteness when
the field and dispatcher causes differ, we do not con-
sider the field cause codes in this analysis.) A cas-
cade of outages is defined as weather related when at
least one of the outages in the cascade has one of the
cause codes “Weather”, “Lightning”, “Galloping Con-
ductors”, “Ice”, “Wind”, or “Tree blown”.
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Figure 3. Probability distributions of initial
(black circles) and cascaded (red squares)
outages with weather (solid line) and no
weather (dashed line). Weather is deter-
mined by cause code.
How the annual cascade rate, average propagation of
cascading outages, and cascade size distribution depend
on weather are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. Accord-
ing to Table 2, only 21% (101/478) of the cascades are
weather related. This implies that only 21% of the initial
outages occurred in a weather-related cascade. And Fig-
ure 3 shows that the distribution of initial outages is sim-
ilar for weather and non-weather related cascades. How-
ever, in Table 2 weather related outages have greatly in-
creased propagation from 0.13 (non-weather related) to
0.55 (weather related) and in Figure 3 there is a corre-
sponding large difference in the distribution of the total
outages in a cascade after the cascading. That is, a mi-
nority of cascades are weather related, but they propa-
gate far more to form larger cascades.
With the method of processing outages into cascades
that we use [20], propagation can arise both from out-
ages causing further outages through interactions in the
network (encompassing electrical physics, control sys-
tems, and human actions) and through independent out-
ages occurring during the cascade that are similar in
mechanism to the initial outages. Note that the pro-
cessing method defining the subsequent cascading stu-
diously avoids determining the causes or explicit depen-
dences of further outages and simply accounts for out-
ages that occur within one hour of previous outages [20].
Indeed [20] states that “One caution is that it is unknown
to what extent exogenous forcing from weather is aug-
mented by additional dependent cascading effects.” Ref-
erence [17] analyzes all the outages together, determines
the average rate of independent outages, and proceeds
to quantify the contribution of statistically independent
outages towards the λ measure of average propagation,
concluding that 4-6% of outages are independent and
classified as cascading outages. This seems an accept-
able error in the contention that the subsequently cas-
cading outages are dependent outages. The contention
essentially relies on the independent outages occurring
at a slow enough rate relative to the typical cascade du-
ration.
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Figure 4. Probability distributions of initial
(black circles) and cascaded (red squares)
outages in summermonths (solid line) and
remainder of year (dashed line).
However, the same contention for the subset of
weather related outages need not have an acceptable er-
ror because there is a much higher rate of independent
outages during bad weather. The methods of Section 5
are not conclusive in this regard, but the results of Sec-
tion 5 are consistent with this conclusion. More im-
portantly, traditional risk analysis does support a much
higher rate of independent outages during bad weather
[24, 25]. This raises a question of the validity of the
method of cascading processing applied to weather re-
lated outages when the cascades and propagation are in-
terpreted as dependent outages occurring through net-
work interactions. However, if the concern is simply the
number of subsequent outages during a one hour period
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Table 2. Some general dependencies of initial outages and average propagation
equivalent annual propagation N = number of outages in cascade
cascade rate λ P [N > 1] P [N > 5] P [N > 10] CAUSE
478 0.28 0.26 0.027 0.007 ALL OUTAGES
101 0.55 0.51 0.096 0.028 WEATHER
377 0.13 0.19 0.009 0.002 NOT WEATHER
588 0.31 0.29 0.04 0.009 SUMMER MONTHS
423 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.006 NOT SUMMER MONTHS
486 0.36 0.34 0.05 0.010 PEAK HOURS
475 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.007 NOT PEAK HOURS
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Figure 5. Probability distributions of initial
(black circles) and cascaded (red squares)
outages at peak hours (solid line) and off-
peak hours (dashed line).
without regard to cause, then the method could retain
some validity for weather related outages. This is the
case, for example, when the concern is the total number
of outages, regardless of cause, that the operators have
to deal with within a one hour period.
The month and time of day can also be used to classify
cascades into the summer peaking months of June, July,
August, September, and the remainder of the year, or
those cascades that start during the peak hours between
3 pm and 8 pm and cascades starting outside these peak
hours. Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5 show the effects of
the summer months and the peak hours. (The equivalent
annual rate shown in Table 2 is the rate if the condition
such as summer months applied all year.) Outages in the
summer months of June, July, August, September have a
modestly increased propagation from 0.25 (not summer)
to 0.31 (summer). Outages in the peak hours between 3
pm and 8 pm have increased propagation from 0.25 (not
peak hours) to 0.36 (peak hours). Note that the cascades
also depend on the initial outages. Indeed, the data in the
summer months shows a 39% higher cascade rate and a
41% higher rate of initial outages. Overall, there is a
moderate increase in cascade propagation during peak
hours and only a small increase in propagation, but an
increased rate of initial outages in the summer months.
However weather effects are larger than either of these
factors.
5. Effect of weather via NOAA storm data
One problem with analyzing the effect of weather
with outage cause codes is that cause codes cannot
describe the weather when there is no outage. Therefore
the line outage rate during bad weather, a key quantity,
cannot be estimated from cause code analysis. Also,
the outage cause codes are manually entered, rely
on subjective judgment about classifying causes, and
in any case include a sizable proportion (22% of the
dispatcher outage cause codes) of causes “Unknown”.
One way to address these problems with a different bad
weather criterion is to coordinate in time and space the
outage data with storm weather records.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) Storm Events Database is a collection
of the occurrence of storm events and other signifi-
cant weather phenomena recorded by NOAA’s National
Weather Service from 1950 to present [26]. The NOAA
historical storm data records for 1999 to 2013 were
obtained for analyzing the storm weather effects influ-
encing our outage data. The NOAA storm data in-
cludes the event type, event start and end time, and
the location within the state by county or zone. The
storm event types that we choose to define as a storm
are “Blizzard”, “Freezing Fog”, “Hail”, “Heavy Rain”,
“Heavy Snow”, “High Wind”, “Ice Storm”, “Light-
ning”, “Sleet”, “Strong Wind”, “Thunderstorm Wind”,
“Tornado”, “Winter Storm”, and “Winter Weather”.
To associate the line outages with the storm data, we
map the buses onto the county they are located in, and
describe each zone by the main counties it intersects. A
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line is defined to be in a county if either its sending or
receiving end bus is in that county. A line is defined
to be in a zone if that zone includes a county that the
line is in. This associates each line with a set of coun-
ties. In some cases this set of counties only contains
one county. A line outage is then classified as a storm
outage if it occurs during a storm event in one of the
counties in the set of counties associated with that line.
It is straightforward to count the number of storm out-
ages of line number k over the period of observation.
Also, the total storm durations for a county is the sum
of the durations of the storms in that county during the
period of observation, and the total storm time for line k
over the period of observation is computed as the aver-
age over the counties of the total storm durations for the
counties that the line is in. Then the line k storm outage
rate Rstormline k = (number of storm outages of line k)/(total
storm time for line k). Finally, the average storm outage
rate Rstorm = (number of lines)−1
∑
k R
storm
line k . The
non-storm line outage rate and the average non-storm
line outage rate Rnostorm are computed similarly.
This data processing approximates the average non-
storm outage rate as Rnostorm = 1.1 outages per year
and the average storm outage rate as Rstorm = 8.1 out-
ages per year. This significant increase in the outage
rate during storm weather has important implications
for processing historical data and simulating cascading.
First of all, models and simulations of cascading should
distinguish and separately consider storm weather and
non-storm weather periods. This conclusion based on
cascading historical data is not surprising given the at-
tention to this distinction in conventional power system
reliability [24, 25] and in [10–13]. Secondly, it is also
clear from conventional power system reliability that the
initial outage rate is higher during bad weather [24, 25].
The high outage rate during storms could be primarily
due to increases in the initial outage rate alone or to in-
creases in both the initial outage rate and the propaga-
tion. The distinction matters to mitigation of cascad-
ing because the initial outage mechanisms differ from
the mechanisms for the propagation of outages through
the network. Thirdly, as already discussed in Section 4,
the significant increase of the average storm line outage
rate will also impact the processing of cascading outages
into generations. It seems that better high-level models
that not only distinguish weather and non-weather con-
ditions but also capture and distinguish the rates of in-
dependent and dependent outages are needed.
The effect of the storm weather on the distributions of
initial and total number of cascaded outages is shown in
Figure 6. In comparing Figure 6 to Figure 3, it should
be noted that bad weather or its severity is differently
defined by the weather cause codes and the storms in
NOAA data.
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Figure 6. Probability distributions of initial
(black circles) and cascaded (red squares)
outages with storms (solid line) and no
storm (dashed line). Storms are deter-
mined by NOAA data.
6. Cause and effect in cascading analysis
While an attribution of cause for outages is attractive
since it often gives possibilities for mitigation, it should
be recognized that the whole notion of detailed cause
(and especially single cause) for cascading outages can
be murky and ill-defined. Causes for initial outages are
less problematic, and often a single cause or multiple
causes can be defined. On the other hand, outages prop-
agating via power system interactions after the initial
outages generally depend on the initial system condi-
tion, the initial outages, and the preceding outages [18].
To suggest an overall methodological context, we can
consider two approaches to cascading: A “bottom-up”
approach specifies a particular cause and effect mecha-
nism of cascading, makes a detailed model of that mech-
anism and then tries to get data for that mechanism. A
“top-down” approach examines available data, at first
without regard to detailed cause or mechanism, and then
tries to divide the data into classes of causes or mecha-
nisms. This paper is top-down and weather is one sim-
ple example of a class of mechanisms. The bottom-
up and top-down approaches are complementary. The
bottom-up approach enables understanding and often in-
sight into mitigation of that mechanism, but there are
dozens of different mechanisms of cascading, and many
of the more unusual and complicated events that often
occur in blackouts are hard to approach in this way, and
very often there is no data available to find the model pa-
rameters. The top-down approach already has the data,
and can give a useful overall statistical description and
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quantification of cascading, but gives much less detailed
insight and as a consequence work towards mitigation
is much less direct. However, the operators will have
to deal with all the outages in real time regardless of
whether there are detailed cause-effect relationships es-
tablished or not. We hope that bottom-up and top-down
approaches will gradually converge towards each other
as the field progresses to better realize the full range of
possibilities of data-driven reliability analysis.
7. Modeling weather effects in OPA
The OPA model [27–29] is a simulation that cal-
culates the long-term risk of cascading blackouts of a
power transmission system under the slow, complex dy-
namics of an increasing power demand and the engineer-
ing responses to blackouts. The individual cascades are
modeled by probabilistic line overloads and outages in
a DC load flow model with linear programming genera-
tion redispatch. We previously validated OPA on a 1553
bus model of the Western North American interconnec-
tion against observed data with some success [8]. Here
we start to explore parameterizing the weather effects
in OPA on the 1553 bus model by modifying OPA and
showing the fit with observed data. For details of OPA,
parameters, and the 1553 bus model we refer to [8].
Figure 7. PDFs of number of outages in
weather and non-weather cascades from
OPA simulation and from observed data.
Inspired by the historical data in the previous sections,
we introduce new OPA parameters pw, p5 and some spa-
tial correlation between multiple initial outages. pw is
the probability that in a given day the weather is the
cause of outages. p5 is the probability that an outage
produced by weather will happen in a given iteration of
the cascade on the days that weather is a factor. The
spatial correlation of the multiple initial outages is in-
troduced by first using OPA parameter p0 to determine
some initial line outages. Once initial line outages have
been calculated, we go through the adjacent lines and
probabilistically determine their failure. Then this pro-
cess is repeated once. The result is that the initial ran-
dom line outages are sometimes augmented with one or
more adjacent lines.
To reexamine the previous fit with the observed data
in [8] with the new parameters, we take pw = 0.25,
which is close to the 21% proportion of weather cas-
cades estimated in section 4. We are not yet able to
estimate p5 from data, but p5 = 0.0002 gives a good
match of the cascades with the observed distribution of
the number of outages in weather and non-weather cas-
cades as shown in Figure 7. (For p5 < 0.0002 the
weather driven cascades tend to be too short, and for
p5 > 0.0002 the slope of the weather PDF from the
OPA results tends to decrease relative to the slope of the
PDF of the data.)
With these parameters, in Figure 8 there is a good
match between OPA and the historical data for the dis-
tribution of load shed, and in Figure 9 there is a match
for the propagation λ in each generation of cascading
that improves upon the match in [8]. These results sug-
gest that weather effects can be included in OPA and
validated against the observed data. Future work should
find a way to estimate p5 from the historical data instead
of calibrating p5 with the distribution of the number of
outages in weather cascades.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we start to explore processing histori-
cal outage data to characterize initial outages and subse-
quent cascading propagation and determine the effects
of weather on cascading. Although only one 14 year
data set from a large North American utility is analyzed
and our specific conclusions are of course limited to that
data set, similar data is routinely collected by many util-
ities worldwide, so that it is straightforward, given ac-
cess to the data, to apply the data processing methods
broadly.
A simple processing method based on outage timing
allows us to distinguish the initial outages from the sub-
sequent cascading. Most of these initial outages are sin-
gle outages that do not have following outages. How-
ever, the data also shows significant numbers of multi-
ple initial outages and initial outages that cascade fur-
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Figure 8. Survival function of fractional
load shed for OPA and for Western inter-
connection historical data from the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation.
ther. The initial outages have considerable variation in
outage frequency, are dependent, and the multiple out-
ages tend to occur in adjacent lines. However the sepa-
rated initial multiple outages have more of a tendency to
cascade further. Momentary outages appear to cascade
further at a similar rate as longer outages. As might be
expected from the differing mechanisms involved in ini-
tial and propagating outages, the lines most involved in
initial outages have some overlap with, but do not coin-
cide with those most involved with subsequent cascad-
ing. The bulk statistics of historical initial outages can
inform the contingency lists for risk-based or determin-
istic cascading studies.
The effects of weather on historical cascading outage
data are studied by means of the weather-related dis-
patcher cause codes in outage data and NOAA storm
data. A minority of cascades are weather-related, but
using the processing methods of the paper, show a sig-
nificantly increased propagation from the initial outages
and a significantly greater outage rate. This suggests
that, following traditional power systems risk analysis,
cascading models and analysis will need to somehow
define and acknowledge bad weather and good weather
regimes. An increased outage rate during bad weather
is confirmed by traditional power system risk analysis,
but its interaction with cascading propagation remains
unclear. In particular, the increased outage rate does not
allow the increased propagation to be mostly attributed
Figure 9. Propagation λ at each generation
(iteration) of cascading from OPA and for
the historical data of the paper.
to propagation of cascading via network effects because
of limitations of the processing method. New bulk cas-
cading models and data-processing methods are needed
for bad weather conditions. Peak hours and peak months
of operation show less impact on cascading propagation
than bad weather, but there is a higher rate of cascades
during these peak conditions.
Historical outage data is very valuable for validating
and calibrating simulations of cascading outages. The
OPA model of long-term cascading risk is one of the few
simulations with some validation with bulk statistics of
historical data [8]. We have started to represent weather
effects in OPA and extend the validation to this case.
Our bulk statistical data processing methods for his-
torical outage data and NOAA data are initial ap-
proaches that are subject to future improvements. How-
ever, our results already show the value of this pro-
cessing for understanding and quantifying key factors
in initial outages and subsequent cascading, and the
prospects for improved methods and further insights are
very good.
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